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Commentary on marriage grants: Article III & same-sex marriage
The blog is pleased to have commentary and analysis of Friday’s grants in the marriage cases from supporters of both sides. This post has
reactions from Neal Devins and Tara Grove, both Professors of Law at William and Mary.
When granting certiorari in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Proposition 8 cases, the Justices rightly called into question whether certain
petitioners were proper parties before the Court. In this post, we argue that the House Bipartisan Legal Adv isory Group (BLAG) is not a proper
party to defend DOMA. Likewise, we doubt that the proponents of Proposition 8 hav e standing to defend California’s v oter-approv ed ban on
same-sex marriage. At the same time, we suspect that the Court will rule on the merits of both cases – something it can still do if it rules against
the BLAG; something it cannot do if it finds the Proposition 8 proponents are without standing.
We start with DOMA. In February 201 1 , the Obama administration announced that it would enforce but not defend DOMA – leav ing the act
without an adv ocate to defend it in court. In March 201 1 , the House BLAG (which consists of fiv e indiv iduals – the Speaker, the majority and
minority leaders, and the majority and minority whips) v oted three to two to interv ene in the case. The three Republican members of the BLAG,
including House Speaker John Boehner, v oted to defend DOMA; the BLAG’s two Democrats, including minority leader and former Speaker Nancy
Pelosi, opposed interv ention. For its part, the Senate nev er considered participating in the DOMA litigation.
The DOMA ex ample highlights two constitutional problems with the BLAG’s role in defending federal statutes. First, the BLAG at best speaks for
only one house of Congress. But when Congress acts, it must act in a bicameral way . The Constitution does not establish a single unified
“Congress;” instead, it v ests legislativ e powers in a Congress “which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representativ es.” The two chambers of
Congress are constitutionally designed to be in constant tension and competition with each other, so that they can serv e as checks on one
another (and/or on the President).
And while the House and Senate hav e ev olv ed ov er the y ears, the two chambers still maintain distinct institutional cultures. The House is largely
controlled by the majority party leadership, while the Senate (due to procedures like the filibuster) can generally take action only with bipartisan
support. The BLAG reflects the norms of the House. Thus, the House majority leadership v oted to defend DOMA ov er the v ocal objection of
minority leaders. Indeed, 1 32 House Democrats filed a July 201 2 amicus brief arguing both that the DOMA is unconstitutional and that “the
Bipartisan Legal Adv isory Group . . . does not speak for a unanimous House on this issue.” The BLAG’s own filings likewise acknowledge that it
represents the v iews of the majority party , stating that although it “seeks consensus whenev er possible, it functions on a majoritarian basis, like
the institution it represents. The Senate, by contrast, enters litigation only when there is broad and bipartisan support within that chamber.
Accordingly , whether the House BLAG represents only the majority party or the entire House, the BLAG cannot purport to speak for a “Congress”
that acts bicamerally .
The BLAG’s defense of statutes is constitutionally problematic for another reason. The Constitution carefully separates the ex ecutiv e and
legislativ e functions to protect against the concentration of power in any one branch. Litigation ov er the meaning and constitutionality of a
federal statute is a crucial part of the ex ecution of federal law. After all, if a court inv alidates a statute, the gov ernment can no longer enforce
that law against future v iolators. Because the defense of federal statutes is an ex ecutiv e function, the House BLAG — an agent of Congress —
cannot perform that function.
None of this is to say that the ex ecutiv e branch is required to defend ev ery federal statute. We do not assert that the Obama administration –
simply because it is enforcing DOMA – must defend it in court. One of us (Neal Dev ins along with Sai Prakash of the Univ ersity of V irginia Law
School) argues in a forthcoming University of Chicago Law Review essay that federal courts are without authority to order the ex ecutiv e (or any
other party ) to make arguments that they disagree with. Instead, federal courts should appoint amici to make arguments that the parties are
unwilling to make. This practice is fairly routine. For ex ample, earlier this week, the Supreme Court appointed an amicus to make arguments
that the Department of Justice was no longer willing to make in a Federal Torts Claim Act case inv olv ing a prison sex ual assault.
Notably , in the DOMA case (United States v. Windsor), the Justices can reject the BLAG’s status as defendant-interv enor and still rule on the
merits. There is an Article III case or controv ersy between the ex ecutiv e branch and Edith Windsor. Although the ex ecutiv e is not defending
DOMA, it is enforcing the law; in this case, the ex ecutiv e mandated that Windsor pay a federal tax on the estate she inherited from her same-sex
spouse. (If the federal gov ernment recognized Windsor’s marriage, she would hav e been entitled to a spousal deduction.) The ex ecutiv e thereby
injured Windsor and, in so doing, set the stage for a constitutional challenge. The Court therefore, in our v iew, properly granted the Solicitor
General’s certiorari petition and can resolv e the concrete dispute between the ex ecutiv e and Windsor.

www.scotusblog.com/2012/12/commentary-on-marriage-grants-article-iii-same-sex-marriage/

1/2

5/14/13

Commentary on marriage grants: Article III & same-sex marriage : SCOTUSblog

The Proposition 8 (Hollingsw orth v. Perry) case bears certain similarities to the DOMA litigation. California Attorney General Kamala Harris (like
her predecessor Jerry Brown) thinks the initiativ e unconstitutional and is unwilling to defend it in court. Moreov er, just as the Obama Justice
Department is urging that DOMA be inv alidated, Harris is leading a nationwide effort of state attorney s general to draft a Supreme Court brief in
support of same-sex marriage. And just as DOMA supporters in Congress are seeking to fill the v oid by interv ening on behalf of the federal
statute, proponents of the initiativ e likewise interv ened to defend the measure against constitutional attack.
There is another similarity – namely , proponents of Proposition 8 may be without authority to defend the initiativ e in court. It is unclear what
personalized injury the ballot sponsors suffer (that distinguishes them from other Californians who disapprov e of same-sex marriage).
Furthermore, in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona (1 997 ), the Supreme Court questioned the Article III standing of initiativ e proponents.
Specifically , although the Court did not rule on this issue, the Justices doubted that initiativ e proponents “hav e a quasi-legislativ e interest in
defending the measure they successfully sponsored.”
Nev ertheless, the issue here seems less clear than it is with the House BLAG. The California Supreme Court held that state law authorized the
Proposition 8 proponents to defend the initiativ e, and (in the decision below) the Ninth Circuit held that such authorization was sufficient for
Article III standing purposes. Although we hav e considerable doubts about whether such state authorization should be decisiv e for Article III
standing, we recognize that there is room for debate on this issue.
In any ev ent, we do not think that the Court will find that the Proposition 8 proponents lack standing. Unlike the DOMA litigation, such a ruling
would depriv e the Court of jurisdiction ov er the case. Indeed, such a ruling would also require the Court to v acate the Ninth Circuit’s narrow
ruling against the initiativ e (because it would mean that the proponents lacked standing to appeal to that court), leav ing in place the (far broader)
district court decision holding that there is a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. More than that, it is unclear whether U.S. District Judge
V aughn Walker’s initial ruling against Proposition 8 would hav e statewide effects or, instead, might be binding only on the parties to that case
(thus setting in motion new litigation challenging Proposition 8). Such a decision would be any thing but heroic or historic; it would be a mess.
Windsor and Perry are likely to be two of the most important constitutional decisions in our lifetimes. If (as we suspect), the Court reaches the
merits of each case, we believ e it will adv ance the cause of same-sex marriage by inv alidating both DOMA and Proposition 8. But, in our v iew,
the Court’s jurisdictional rulings — on the power of a single chamber of Congress and priv ate sponsors of ballot initiativ es to defend federal and
state measures — will also hav e important implications, informing the scope of the constitutional separation of powers at both the federal and
state lev el.
Neal Devins is the Goodrich Professor of Law at William and Mary Law School; Tara Leigh Grove is a V isiting Associate Professor at
Northw estern University School of Law & Associate Professor at William and Mary Law School. Professors Devins and Grove are w orking
together on an article in w hich they contend that Congress lacks the pow er to defend federal statutes in court.
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